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PROGRESSIVE TAXATION AND HAPPINESS
THOMAS D. GRIFFITH*
Abstract: This Article explores the optimal level of income redistribution
by examining the potential welfare gains from redistributive tax and
spending policies. Drawing on recent research on human happiness, this
Article argues that while wealthy nations are generally happier than their
poorer counterparts, neither national nor individual economic growth
appear to have an appreciable impact on the subjective well-being of the
citizens of relatively wealthy nations. Significant causes of this finding
include the problem of rivalry—that increases in the income of some
depress the happiness of others—and the fact that individuals over-
estimate the degree to which additional consumption will improve their
happiness. Studies show the level of inequality in a society also may affect
levels of happiness. Ultimately, happiness research is consistent with the
strongest justification for adopting a progressive tax structure--income
has declining marginal utility thus redistribution can increase total
welfare in a society.
INTRODUCTION
Why adopt a progressive tax rate structure? In our 1987 article
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure, Joseph Bankman and I argued that
the strongest argument for progressivity is that transferring income
from richer to poorer individuals through a combination of taxation
and government spending increases total welfare or utility in the soci-
ety.' The reason such transfers increase welfare is simple: additional
money produces more utility for a poor person than a rich person. 2
Progressive taxation, however, may be costly. The higher marginal
rates required to fund redistribution may reduce work effort 3
 and en-
* John B. Milliken Professor of Mutation, University of Southern California Law
School. A.B., Brown University; MAT., Harvard Graduate School of Education; J.D., Har-
vard Law School. An earlier version of this Article was presented at The State of the Fed-
eral Income Taxation Symposium: Rates, Progressivity, and Budget Processes" at Boston
College Law School. I would like to thank the participants at this conference for their
comments. In addition, I would like to thank Linda Beres for her significant comments
and editorial assistance.
1 See generally Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987).
2 Id. at 1947.
Id. at 1919-21.
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courage individuals to engage in costly and nonproductive activities to
shelter their income from taxation. 4
 The gains in social welfare from
redistributing income to the poor, then, must be weighed against the
losses in social welfare from reduced work effort.
The size of the efficiency costs associated with progressive taxa-
tion is a matter of debate. Professor Bankman and I argued that some
of the efficiency costs of progressivity, including increased complexity
and reduced taxpayer compliance, were smaller than had been sug-
gested previously. 5
 More importantly, we argued that under any plau-
sible assumptions regarding the costs and benefits, some level of re-
distribution is optimal. 6
The question, therefore, is not whether redistribution is optimal,
but how much redistribution is optimal.? Determining the ideal level of
redistribution requires estimating both the efficiency costs of higher
tax rates and the welfare gains from redistribution. Neither is easy to
do. A survey of the literature on the impact of the rate structure on
work effort alone would require a lengthy article. 8 And one still would
need to examine its impact on a variety of other issues, such as the
complexity of the tax code, savings rates, and tax compliance.
I do not revisit here the debate over the efficiency costs of redistri-
bution. Instead, I look at recent research on the causes and correlates
of human happiness, which may shed light on the potential gains from
redistribution. The questions are important. How much, if at all, does
redistributing income from the rich to the poor increase total happi-
ness in a society? Is the answer in wealthy societies different from the
answer in poor societies? If redistributive taxation and spending poli-
cies slow economic growth, does such a slowdown significantly reduce
total happiness in a society? More broadly, what is the relationship be-
tween economic conditions in a society and the happiness of the mem-
bers of that society?
Until fairly recently there was little serious scholarship focusing on
such questions. Over the past two decades, however, there has been an
explosion of what might be called "happiness studies"—research on the
determinants of human happiness. In this Article, I examine some of
4 Id. at 1937-41.
5 Id. at 1929-45.
6 Ban kman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1945-67.
7 Id. at 1966-67.
See id. at 1910-15 (discussing briefly the literature on the impact of tax rates on the
labor supply as of 1987).
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the central findings of this literature and consider the implications of
those findings for redistributive tax and spending policies.
Part I considers the ways in which researchers measure the happi-
ness or subjective well-being of individuals. 9 Part II examines studies of
subjective well-being among nations." When nations are compared at a
given point in time, the results are consistent with the standard intui-
don of declining marginal utility of income. Cross-national studies sug-
gest that the citizens of richer nations tend to be happier than the citi-
zens of their poorer counterparts, but additional income has a much
greater impact on poor nations. The findings are quite different, how-
ever, for longitudinal studies on national well-being. Surprisingly, eco-
nomic growth appears to have little measurable impact on the subjec-
tive well-being of the citizens of relatively wealthy nations. This raises
important questions about the centrality of such growth as a matter of
public policy.
Part III explores the impact of income on citizens within a na-
tion. 11 The results are surprising: increases in income over time gen-
erally produce little or no improvement in the subjective well-being of
individuals. A significant problem is rivalry—increases in the income
of one individual depress the happiness of others.
Part IV considers the harm that individuals inflict upon themselves
by overestimating the degree to which additional consumption will im-
prove their happiness. 12 I discuss two key reasons for this overestima-
tion. Adaptation theory suggests that luxury items lose much of their
enjoyment once the recipient becomes used to having them. Aspiration
theory posits that the satisfaction of individuals with their standard of
living depends upon whether they have achieved their aspirations. Ad-
ditional income provides little satisfaction because aspirations rise with
income. Part V discusses whether inequality itself reduces individual
utility even after controlling for individual income." Part VI suggests
some of the implications of happiness research for tax policy."
Before continuing, however, I should add a note on the norma-
tive basis of my analysis. My analysis in this Article is explicitly utilitar-
ian or, more broadly, "welfarist." I assume that the government's goal
in structuring a tax system—and other programs—is increasing the
9 See infra notes 20-44 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 45-92 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 83-119 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 119-151 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 152-176 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 177-185 and accompanying text.
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utility or happiness of its citizens. 15
 With respect to progressive taxa-
tion, such a welfarist approach contrasts with various traditional
justifications for progressivity, such as taxation according to benefits
received and taxation based on equal or proportionate sacrifice.
Those theories have been soundly criticized elsewhere. 16
A variety of theories of distributive justice support and oppose
redistribution of income." I do not enter this debate here. 18 Rather, I
simply assume that improving aggregate social welfare, as measured
by the individual utility levels or happiness of the population, remains
one important goal of tax policy.ig
I. MEASURING HAPPINESS
A. The Traditional Debate
Estimating the gains from redistributing income is a thorny task.
Indeed, some early critics of progressive taxation argued that it was im-
possible to determine that an additional dollar was worth more to a
to The government also might (and should) have an interest in improving the well-
beina of noncitizens, but I do not address that complexity here.
16
 The classic critique of benefits received and sacrifice theories in the legal literature
is in Walter]. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Cm.
L. REV. 417 (1952). This essay was reprinted one year later as a book with an updated fore-
word. See generally WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRES- •
SIVE TAXATION (1953). References in this Article are for the latter. A more recent critique
of arguments for progressive taxation can be found in Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness
or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12
Am. J. TAX POLY 221 (1995). Strangely, Professor Schoenblum classifies equal and propor-
tionate sacrifice theories as utilitarian, even though neither seeks to maximize utility. See id.
at 237-41. For an interesting analysis of some of the philosophical arguments for progres-
sivity and their relationship to public opinion, see generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equal-
ity, Liberty and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FoRDIIAM URB. L.J. 607 (1996).
17 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (opposing redis-
tribution); JolIN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (supporting redistribution).
18
 For a brief discussion of alternative measures of social welfare, see Bankman &
Griffith, supra note 1, at 1948-50.
19 For classic utilitarian principles, see JEREMY BENTIIAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (JM. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarenden Press
1996) (1789) and JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1988) (1861). For a more recent utilitarian argument, see R.M. HARE, MORAL THINK-
ING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT (1981). For a powerful axiomatic argument for utili-
tarianism, see John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. Poi_ ECON. 309 (1955). Essays debating utilitarianism are con-
tained in SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973)
and UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Atnartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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poor person than to a rich person." The argument constituted a small
part of a broader attack on the ability to make interpersonal compari-
sons generally. This "ordinal revolution" dominated economic thought
for decades and remains highly influential today.
Such extreme skepticism abOut the ability of individuals to make
interpersonal utility comparisons is misplaced. Individuals make
judgments about the mental states of others every day. People de-
scribe their friends and acquaintances as cheerful, sad, or in pain and
behave as though these descriptors correspond to actual mental
states. Indeed, no society could survive that did not make and act on
judgments about the mental states of others.
To be sure, individuals cannot directly observe the subjective feel-
ings of others. And some judgments seem more reliable than others. For
example, it seems certain that Alice, who suffers severe burns in a fire,
endures far greater pain than Bob, who nicks himself while shaving.
judging the marginal utility of money is more difficult. An addi-
tional $1000 obviously means more to a family in poverty than to a mid-
timillionaire.2 ' Greater uncertainty exists, however, over whether an
extra $1000 will produce more happiness for Carol, who earns $50,000
per year than for Doug, who earns twice that amount. Perhaps Doug
takes great pleasure from an expensive hobby that the additional $1000
will help him pursue, while Carol enjoys nothing more than reading
classic novels which she borrows from her local library. Despite these
complexities, however, it seems reasonable to believe that additional
income usually offers greater utility to the poor than to the rich.
The task of estimating the rate at which the marginal utility of
income declines is even thornier. One popular conjecture .
 is that the
utility from income is proportional to the logarithm of the income. 22
Under this approach, the welfare gain from increasing Emily's annual
income from $50,000 to $100,000 per year equals the welfare gain
from increasing Fred's income from $100,000 to $200,000 per year.
The popularity of the logarithmic utility function surely rests, in part,
20 BLUM & KAINEN, supra note 16, at 57-63; Lionel Robbins, The Nature and Significance
of Economic Science, in TIIE l'ittiosorny OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 113,129-32 (Dan-
iel M. Hausman ed., 1984).
21 Joshua Greene Sc Jonathan Baron, Intuitions About Declining Marginal Utility, 14 J.
BEIIAV. DECISION MAKING 243,244-45 (2001).
22 The formula is U, k (log 1'). See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1952. See getter-
a/i5tJ.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. EcoN.
STUD. 175 (1971).
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on its significant computational advantages. It may also roughly
reflect some scholars' intuitions.
My own informal surveys of students in my introductory tax
course suggest a slightly more rapid drop in the marginal utility of
income than that suggested by the logarithmic approach. Each year, I
ask my tax students to choose between two worlds. In World A, the
students would have an income of $100,000 per year for life. In World
B, the students would have an equal chance of a $50,000 income or a
$200,000 income, for an expected value of $125,000. In each case,
income would be adjusted for inflation annually, but could not be
augmented in any other way. In more than a decade of these surveys,
the majority of students have always preferred World A—the certain
$100,000 income—over the lottery, despite the lottery's higher ex-
pected dollar value. 23
B. Happiness Surveys
Recent research on happiness provides more persuasive evidence
than intuition or informal student polls regarding the relationship
between income and individual happiness. The most common
method used to estimate the subjective welfare or happiness of indi-
viduals involves simply asking them. Subjects might be asked, "Taken
all together, how would you say things are these days[?] [W]ould you
say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?" 24 Alter-
natively, subjects might be asked to respond on a ten-point scale to a
question, such as, "All things considered, how satisfied are you with
your life as a whole these days?"25
1. Self-Reported Utility and Cognitive Errors
Answers to survey questions likely act as imperfect measures of
actual happiness. The meaning of terms such as "pretty happy" may
vary over time, and cultural norms may vary regarding whether indi-
23 Typically, the median student in the class shows indifference in a choice between the
lottery and a certain income of about $80,000.
24
 This question was asked of U.S. citizens by the National Opinion Research Center.
NAT'L, OPINION RES. CTN., UNIV. OF CHI., GENERAL. SOCIAL SURVEY: 1972-2000 CUMULA-
TIVE CODEBOOK, COUEBOOK VARIABLE: HAPPY, at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS//
rnd1998/merged/cdbk/happy.hun (last modified May 1, 2001).
24
 The life satisfaction score in the World Values Survey II is based on this question. Ed
Diener & Eunkook Mark Suh, National Differences in Subjective Well-Being, in WELL-BEING:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 434, 435 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter WELL-BEING).
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viduals should profess to being extremely happy. Responses may de-
pend on the precise wording of the questions or, in the case of a lar-
ger survey, on the nature of the preceding questions."
Individuals also may make cognitive errors in reporting their own
well-being. Studies show systematic differences between contempora-
neously reported pain levels and the later memory of that pain. 27 An
individual's subsequent memory of a painful experience can be pre-
dicted well by the peak pain level and the end pain level. 28
The duration of the pain has little impact on the subsequent
evaluation of its severity. Indeed, adding an additional period of pain at
a lower intensity to a painful experience actually can improve the retro-
active evaluation of a painful experience. 29 In one experiment, subjects
took part in two trials in which they placed one of their hands in cold
water." In the short trial, participants kept a hand in water at fourteen
degrees Celsius for one minute. In the long trial, the immersion lasted
a total of a minute and a half. For the first sixty seconds, subjects again
kept a hand in water at fourteen degrees Celsius, but the temperature
of the water then gradually was increased to fifteen degrees Celsius over
the final thirty seconds—a less painful, but still unpleasant tempera-
ture. Approximately 65% of the subjects chose to repeat the long trial
rather than the short trial." Thus, for most individuals, adding an extra
thirty seconds of reduced pain to an already painful experience re-
duced the remembered unpleasantness of the experience.
Individuals may also misreport pleasant experiences and overem-
phasize recent events. 32 If yesterday was an enjoyable day, it may skew
an individual's assessment of the entire previous week." Reports of cur-
rent life satisfaction also may depend on minor contemporaneous posi-
" In one survey, for example, individuals were asked the following two questions: (1)
"How happy are you?" and (2) "How many dates did you have in the last month?" Daniel
Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 25, at 3, 22. If the happiness
question was asked first, the correlation between the two answers was 0.12, If the dates
question preceded the happiness question, the correlation was 0.66. Id.; see also Norbert
Schwarz & Fritz Smack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental Processes and Their Methodo-
logical Implications, in WELL-BEING, supra note 25, at 61, 62-64, 79.
27 Kahneman, supra note 26, at 19-20.
25 Id.
n Id. at 20.
so Id.
51 Id. Similar results were obtained in laboratory experiments involving loud noises
and in clinical evaluations of the reported pain of patients undergoing a colonoscopy. Id.
52 Arthur A. Stone et al., Ecological Momentary Assessment, in WELL-BEING, /Rpm note 25,
at 26, 28. See generally NORBERT SCHWARZ, & SEYMOUR SUDMAN, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEM-
ORY AND THE VALIDITY OF RETROSPECTIVE REPORTS (1994).
55
 Stone et al., supra note 32, at 28.
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Live or negative experiences. Subjects interviewed on a sunny day are
more likely to report satisfaction with their lives as a whole than sub-
jects interviewed when it is raining. 34
 Subjects interviewed in a smelly,
noisy laboratory report lower satisfaction with life than do subjects in-
terviewed in a friendly office. 35
 Conversely, subjects interviewed in an
unpleasant room report greater satisfaction with their own housing. 3°
Counterfactuals can influence assessments of well-being. Winning
an Olympic silver medal for finishing second in an event would seem to
be clearly better than winning a bronze medal for finishing third. Yet
Olympic bronze medal winners report higher levels of satisfaction than
do silver medal winners." Apparently, bronze medal winners more eas-
ily may imagine a downward counterfactual—winning no medal at all—
while silver medal winners picture the upward counterfactual—a gold
medal."
2. Self-Reported Utility: Supporting Evidence
Despite potential cognitive biases, it seems that a meaningful re-
lationship exists between self-reported utility and the respondent's
underlying mental state. Notwithstanding the influence of temporary
factors such as current mood, reported well-being remains fairly sta-
ble across situations. Reported levels of pleasant and unpleasant
moods during work, for example, show a strong correlation with re-
ported levels of pleasant and unpleasant moods during recreation. 39
Further, reported life satisfaction is fairly stable throughout an indi-
vidual's life span. 49
 Self-reported well-being strongly correlates with
the reports of family and friends and with the amount of smiling dur-
ing an interview." Self-reported welfare also correlates with the ability
of respondents to recall positive events in their lives. 42
34 Schwarz & Smack, supra note 26, at 75.
33 Id. at 76.
33 Id.
37 Id. at 67.
38 Id.
" See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality and Subjective Well-Being, in WELL
BEING, supra note 25, at 213, 215 (reporting a 0.70 correlation for pleasant moods and a
0.74 correlation for unpleasant moods). See generally Ed Diener et al., Person X Situation
Interactions: Choice of Situations and Congruence Response Models, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 580 (1984).
40 See Diener & Lucas, supra note 39, at 214.
"Diener & Suh, supra note 25, at 437.
42 Galina Balatsky & Ed Diener, Subjective bell-Being Among Russian Students, 28 SOC. IN-
DICATORS Ras. 225, 238-39 (1993); Diener & Suh, supra note 25, at 437.
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In addition, more "objective" measures of a successful life corre-
spond with self-reported happiness. Individuals who report themselves
to be happy, for example, are less likely to be absent from work, less
likely to die prematurely, and less likely to have headaches, digestive
disorders, and similar ailments.45 In sum, while not without problems,
research based on subjective measures of well-being may provide use-
ful information about the causes and correlates of human happiness. 44
II. WELL-BEING AMONG NATIONS
A. Cross National Comparisons of Well-Being
International surveys of subjective well-being find large and stable
differences among nations. A study of well-being among members of
the European Union from 1973 to 1998 found that year after year, citi-
zens of Denmark were roughly five times more likely than citizens of
France or Italy to describe themselves as "very satisfied" with their lives,
and twelve times more likely than citizens of Portugal to report high
satisfaction. 45 Global surveys, such as the World Values Survey, find
similar differences in national well-being. 46 Moreover, national differ-
ences in subjective well-being do not appear to be a problem of transla-
tion, as sharp differences exist among nations speaking the same lan-
guage.47
Wealthy nations generally demonstrate much greater subjective well-
being than poor nations. Figure 1 shows the relatibn between per capita
national income and mean life satisfaction for forty-two nations based on
43 ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 68-71 (1999).
44
 For a good summary of the issues surrounding the measurement of individual hap-
piness by surveys, see Bernard M.S. van Praag Sc Paul Frijters, The Measurement of Welfare
and Well-Being: The Leyden Approach, in WELL-BEING, supra note 25, at 413.
45 Ronald Inglehart & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happi-
ness, in CULTURE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 165, 166-67 (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh
eds., 2000).
45 Ed Diener & Shigehiro Oishi, Money and Happiness: income and Subjective Well-Being
Across Nations, in CULTURE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, supra note 45, at 185, 198-201;
Inglehart & Klingemann, supra note 45, at 170. See generally RONALD INGLEHART, Mon-
ERN1ZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
43 SOCIETIES (1997); WORLD VALUES SURVEY, http://WWW.WOrldVallICSSID-Vey,Orgii.
47 Inglehart & Klingemann, supra note 45, at 167-69; see Piet Ouweneel & Ruut Veen-
hoven, Cross-National Differences in Happiness: Cultural Bias or Social Quality?, in CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 168, 171-73 (Nico Bleichrodt & Pieter J.D,
Drenth eds., 1991).
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responses to the World Values Survey 11. 48
 The correlation between mean
income and mean life satisfaction among the nations is 0.69. 49
Figure 1: Income and Life Satisfaction in 42 Nations
The relationship between income and well-being is not uniform
throughout the income distribution. For poor nations, additional in-
come appears to have a significant impact on reported well-being.
Once citizens of a nation have reached a level of reasonable financial
security, however, additional income has little effect. 5°
This can be illustrated by separating the above nations into the
following two groups: poorer nations with a per capita income below
$15,000 and richer nations with an income above $15,000. Figure 2
shows the least-squares linear regression line for the poorer nations in
the sample.51
 The slope of the line indicates that within this income
48 See Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 199 tb1.8.2. Figure 1 is based on data from Ed
Diener and Shigehiro Oishi. Id, Where available, income is based on purchasing power
parity using U.S. dollars. Gross national product per capita is used in the few cases in
which purchasing power parity is not available. Id. at 199. Life satisfaction is a standard
score derived from the World Values Survey II and one other survey. Id. at 198-99.
49
 A correlation of 0.686 was obtained by the author using Microsoft Excel. See Diener
& Oishi, supra note 46, at 198 (stating a correlation of 0.69).
" See Inglehart & Klingemann, supra note 45, at 171.
51
 These calculations were made by the author using Microsoft Excel.
Figure 2: Income end Life Satisfaction: Poorer Nations
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range, $1000 of additional income increases life satisfaction by about
one-tenth of a standard deviation. 52
Figure 3 shows the much flatter regression line for the richer na-
tions in the sample. 53 Within this income range, $1000 of additional in-
come increases life satisfaction less than one-fiftieth of a standard devia-
tion.54
Figure 3: Income and Life Satisfaction: Richer Nations
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62 The slope of the regression line is 0.000104.
55 These calculations were made by the author using Microsoft Excel.
54 The slope of the regression line is 0.000019.
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The finding that additional income has a greater impact in _poor
nations stands in line with the discoveries of other researchers." This
result does not come as a surprise. Most citizens of poor nations will
use extra income to satisfy basic needs; in wealthy countries, those
needs already are met for most citizens.
Income does not explain, of course, all differences in national well-
being. Among both richer and poorer nations, there are significant de-
viations from the happiness that would be predicted based on income
alone. For example, individuals living in former Soviet Bloc nations
show less satisfaction with life than would be predicted by their in-
come.56 Indeed, in a recent survey of subjective well-being, seven of the
eight lowest-ranking societies were former members of the U.S.S.R. 57 By
contrast, historically Protestant nations tend to have a higher level of
subjective well-being than predicted by their income, even if only a small
portion of the population now attends church regularly."
Democratic institutions and subjective well-being also show a strong
correlation." Nevertheless, because democracy is so closely associated
with a strong economy, it is difficult to determine its independent con-
tribution to well-being." Increased democracy does not ensure in-
creased happiness. Russia, for example, has shown a decline in happi-
ness since adopting free elections in 1991. 61 Conversely, while some
scholars consider China to be the least free of the sixty-four countries
included in the World Values Surveys, China nonetheless demonstrates
a relatively high level of subjective well-being. 62 More generally, the small
sample size of cross-national surveys combines with a strong correlation
between democratic institutions, protection of human rights, and social
equality to make it difficult to determine the independent contribution
of each of these factors to subjective well-being. 63
In sum, while not without problems, cross-national comparisons
do not deviate from the traditional notion of declining marginal util-
55 See, e.g., Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 194-97; Ruut Veenhoven, Is Happiness Rela-
tive?. 24 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 1, 26-27, 32 (1991).
56 See Inglehart & Klingernann, supra note 45, at 171.
"Id. at 171, 172-73 tb1.7.1, 174 fig. 7.3.
56 Id. at 171.
59 Id. at 177-79 (finding a correlation of 0.78).
60 See id. at 179.
Inglehart & Klingemann, supra note 45, at 179.
62 See id. at 179-80.
65 Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 201. For studies finding almost no correlation be-
tween human rights and subjective well-being once income is controlled, see . generally Ed
Diener et al., Factors Predicting the Subjective Mil-Being of Nations, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PsyclioL. 851 (1995).
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ity of income. Additional income increases the utility of the citizens of
all nations but has the greatest effect where those citizens are poor.
B. Longitudinal Studies of National Well-Being
Almost universally, individuals view economic growth as an impor-
tant goal for any nation. This view presumably finds ground in a belief
that a high rate of economic growth will improve significantly the well-
being of that nation's citizens." Studies of subjective well-being over
time, however, raise serious questions about this conclusion. Even high
rates of economic growth may have only a modest impact on long-term
happiness in developed nations. 86 Figure 4, for example, shows per cap-
ita income and stated happiness in the United States from 1972 to
1998, a period of high economic growth for the country.° Income is
adjusted for inflation and shown in year 2001 dollars.
Figure 4: Income end Happiness in the Stilted States 1972.19911
" StrAndrewi. Oswald, Happiness and EconomicPerforrnance,107 ECON. J. 1815, 1816 (1997).
66 Short-term macroeconomic effects such as a recession, however, may have a
significant impact on happiness. See Rafael Di Tella et al., The Macaveconomies of Happiness,
85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 809, 823 (2003).
66 The income data are from the U.S. Census Bureau's Historical Income Tables—
People, which incorporates data from the Current Population Survey, Annual Demographic
Supplements. U.S. CENSUS BURF.AU, TABLE P-1: TOTAL CI'S POPULATION AND PER CAPITA
MONEY INCOME: 1967 TO 2001 (published Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
income/histinc/p01.html (last revised May 13, 2004). The happiness data are from the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center. NAT'L. OPINION RES. Cm., UNIV. OF Cm., GENERAL SOCIAL
SunvEv: 1972-2000 CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK, CODEBOOK TRENDS: HAPPY, at http://webapp.
icpsraimich.edu/GSS/And1998/merged/cdbk-trn/liappy.htm  (last modified May 1, 2001).
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During this twenty-six year period, real per capita income ill the
United States grew from $13,821 to $21,821, an increase of 58%. At
the same time, the percentage of respondents who professed to be
"very happy" actually fe11. 67
 During the first five years of the period,
from 1972 to 1976, the portion of the sample reporting to be very
happy averaged 34.6%.68
 During the last five years, from 1994 to 1998,
an average of only 32% professed to be very happy.° Other nations
show similar results. Rapid economic growth in France and Japan
since the end of World War II produced little increase in subjective
well-being in those countries."
Figure 5 shows the relationship between economic growth and
change in life satisfaction for the fourteen developed nations for
which at least four surveys were available."
67
 Indeed, the correlation between per capita income and the portion of respondents
indicating that they were 'very happy" was -0.34. Alternatively, a "happiness index" can be
created by assigning a value from one to three for the responses "not too happy," "pretty
happy," and "very happy," respectively. There was a weak positive correlation of 0.10 between
income and the happiness index. Little weight should be given, however, to the specific cor-
relations, because for either measure of happiness, there was little change during the twenty-
year neriod. These correlations were calculated by the author using Microsoft Excel.
6a These calculations were made by the author using Microsoft Excel.
6°
 These calculations were made by the author using Microsoft Excel. The overall hap-
piness index, described above, averaged 2.21 for both the 1972 to 1976 and 1994 to 1998
periods. See supra note 67.
7° Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 202; Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh, Measuring
Quality of Life: Economic, Social and Subjective Indicators, 40 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 189, 209,
211 tbl.I (1997); Diener & Suh, supra note 25, at 441; see also Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer,
What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. Ecox. LITERATURE 402, 413-14
(2002). For a recent study finding that happiness declined in the United States and was
flat in Great Britain over the past twenty-five years, see David G. Blanchflower & AndrewJ.
Oswald, Well Being over Time in Britain and the USA, 881 PUB. ECON. 1359, 1380 (2004).
71
 The figures and calculations are based on data reported by Ed Diener and Shigehiro
Oishi. See Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 203 tb1.8.3. Luxembourg was included in Die-
ner and Oishi's analysis, but it is excluded here because data on that nation's economic
growth rate was not stated.
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The slope of the linear regressiOn line is nearly flat and the correla-
tion between economic growth and growth in subjective well-being is
less than 0.10.72 Notwithstanding robust economic growth in all of the
surveyed countries, the studies show inconsistent growth in subjective
well-being. Only seven of the fourteen nations with a growing econ-
omy demonstrated any increase in subjective well-being, while five na-
tions manifested a decline in well-being. Subjective well-being re-
mained unchanged in the United States and the Netherlands.
Moreover, one nation, Portugal, drove the slight growth in subjective
well-being. Portugal enjoyed the strongest growth in welfare by far—
more than double that of its closest competitor, Italy. 73 Excluding Por-
tugal from the analysis causes the small correlation between the
growth of income and welfare to 'disappear entirely. 74
A recent study by Michael Hagerty and Ruut Veenhoven examines
a somewhat different data set including developing nations with much
• 72 The regression was calculated by the author using Microsoft Excel. The slope of the
regression line is 0.00528. The correlation between economic growth and subjective well-
being growth is 0.098.
73 Portugal's slope of subjective well-being was 0.09. The next highest nation was Italy
with a slope of 0.04. Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 203 tbt.8.3.
44 The correlation, excluding Portugal, is -0.0239.
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lower per capita incomes than previously studied. 75 Their analysis in-
cludes new data from the 1990s, but excludes some earlier surveys. 76
The authors divided the nations into three groups according to
gross domestic product ("GDP") per capita. 77
 (For simplicity; I refer to
this as income.) Increased income positively correlates with increased
happiness for each group, but poorer nations demonstrate the effect in
a more significant way. In the richest nations—the United States, Japan,
Norway, Demark, and Luxembourg—an additional $1000 per capita
income increased life satisfaction on average by 0.024 units on a ten-
point scale. 78
 In the middle nations—the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy—an additional
$1000 income increased life satisfaction by 0.045 units. 79 In the poorest
nations—Spain, Portugal, Greece, South Africa, Brazil, South Korea,
Mexico, India, and the Philippines—an additional $1000 income im-
proved life satisfaction by a robust 1.67 units. 99 An extra dollar of in-
come in a poor nation thus produced thirty-seven times as much utility
as an extra dollar in a middle nation and seventy times as much utility
as an extra dollar in a rich nation. 81
C. Cross-National Studies: Results and Implications
There are two central findings of cross-national happiness studies.
First, additional income affects poor nations more than rich nations.
Second, long-term economic growth displays a surprisingly small im-
pact on the well-being of nations once a reasonable level of economic
development has been obtained.
The meager impact of economic growth on happiness in wealthy
countries is a corollary, in part, of declining marginal utility of in-
come. The impact of long-term growth on happiness, though, is even
75 Michael R. Hagerty & Runt Veenhoven, Wealth and Happiness Revisited—Growing Na-
tional Income Does Go with Greater Happiness, 64 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 1, 3 (2003).
70 See id. at 8-9.
77
 Id. at 9.
78 See id. at 13 tb1.11I. Average gross domestic product ("GDP") per capita (in 1995 U.S.
dollars) in the richest group of nations varied from a high of $19,874 in Norway to a low of
$17,584 in the United States. Id. at 10 tbl.II.
79 See id. at 13 thin. Average GDP per capita in the middle group of nations varied
from a high of $15,372 in France to a low of $8953 in Ireland. Id. at 10 LIAM.
93 See Hagerty & Veenhoven, supra note 75, at 13 chilli. Average GDP per capita in the
lowest income nations varied from a high of $8144 in Spain to a low of $321 in India. Id. at
10 tb1.1I.
81 The calculation for a poor nation is 1.67/0.045 = 37.1. The calculation for a rich na-
tion is 1.67/0.024 = 69.6.
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smaller than suggested by traditional views of the declining value of
money. Several wealthy nations, for example, show no increase what-
soever in reported happiness despite enormous increases in per cap-
ita income. I consider various explanations for these results below. 82
Before then, however, I must examine the impact of income on indi-
vidual well-being within a single nation.
III. INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS WITHIN A NATION: POSITIONAL AND
NONPOSITIONAL GOODS AND THE RIVALRY PROBLEM
A. Happiness and the Income Distribution
Research on the impact of increased income on the happiness of
individuals within a single nation parallels findings from cross-national
surveys. At any given time, individuals at the top of the income distribu-
tion express greater happiness than those with lower incomes, but addi-
tional income affects the happiness of the poor more than the happi-
ness of the rich. Furthermore, even a sizeable increase in the income of
all citizens through long-term economic growth exhibits little impact
on subjective well-being.85
Table 1 displays the relationship between income and happiness
in the United States for the years 1972 to 1974 and 1994 to 1996.84
The happiness scale is as follows: one signifies "not too happy," two
means "pretty happy," and three indicates "very happy." 85
Table 1: Income and Happiness in the United States
1972-74 1994-96
Decile Income (1996$) Happiness Income (1996$) Happiness
1 2522 1.92 2586 1.94
2 5777 2.09 5867 2,03
3 8694 2.17 8634 2.07
4 11,114 2.22 11,533 2.15
5 13,517 2.19 14,763 2.19
6 15,979 2.29 17,666 2.29
7 18,713 2.24 21,128 2.20
8 22,343 2.31 25,745 2.20
9 28,473 2.26 34,688 2.30
10 46,338 2.36 61,836 2.36
82 See infra notes 119-176 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 64-81, Figure 4, and accompanying text.
84 The data are from Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 410 tb1.1. The listed income is
the total household income in 1996 U.S. dollars divided by the square root of the total
number of household members. Id. at 410.
83 Id.
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In both the 1972 to 1974 and 1994 to 1996 surveys, households in
the top deciles expressed greater happiness than those in the middle
deciles, who in turn were happier than those in the bottom deciles. The
relationship was not linear. Moving from the bottom decile to the fifth
decile in 1996 required an additional $12,177 and produced a utility
gain of 0.25 points." In this low-income range, an additional $1000 of
income produced an average increase in happiness of 0.0205 points.87
In the same year, moving from the sixth decile to the top decile re-
quired an additional $44,170 and produced a utility gain of 0.07
points." In this high-income range, an additional $1000 produced an
average increase in happiness of only 0.0016 points. 89 Thus, an addi-
tional dollar of income over the low-income range had more than twelve
times the impact on happiness of an extra dollar in the high-income
range." Results from the 1972 to 1974 data showed a similar decline in
the marginal utility of income. 9t These results are illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6; Utility Gain Par $1,000 Income (1996 dollars)
1St lo 5th deck,: 1972-74 6th to 101h decdo: 197274 1st lo fith docile: 1994-96 6th to 10th docile: 1994.96
Income Category
9° The calculation for additional income is $14,763 - $2,586 = $12,177. The calculation
for utility gain is 2.19 -1.94 = 0.25.
87
 The calculation for average increase in happiness is 0.25/12.177 = 0.0205.
99 The calculation for additional income is $61,836 - $17,666 = $44,170. The calcula-
tion for utility gain is 2.36 - 2.29 = 0.07.
99 The calculation for average increase in happiness is 0.07/44.17 = 0.0016.
9° The calculation is 0.0205/0.0016 = 12.81.
91 From 1972 to 1974, an additional $1000 produced an increase in happiness of
0.0246 in the bottom five deciles and 0.0023 in the top five deciles. An additional dollar of
income within the low-income range had more than ten times the impact of an additional
dollar within the high-income range.
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Even a proportional increase in income does not affect high and
low income levels equally. In the 1994 to 1996 data, doubling an indi-
vidual's income increased happiness by 0.05 points on average in the
lower five deciles. In the top five deciles, doubling income increased
happiness by only 0.03 points. 92 Other studies finding that income has
a stronger relationship to happiness at the lower portion of the in-
come distribution support these results."
In Part II.B , I noted that significant growth in per capita income
has not increased the portion of citizens who call themselves very
happy. 94 This phenomenon is even more striking if only U.S. house-
holds in the top decile are considered. These wealthy households ex-
perienced a much greater than average growth in income-33.4% as
compared to an average increase of 8.5% for the lower nine deciles-
yet these households reported no increase whatsoever in happiness."
B. Happiness and Changes in Income: The Relativity Trap
Although on average individuals with higher incomes demon-
strate greater happiness than poorer individuals at any point in time,
the average happiness of a cohort remains relatively constant over its
members' lifetimes despite significant growth in income." This
finding tracks the evidence noted above, that substantial economic
growth over the past several decades did little to raise the happiness
levels in developed nations." Some refer to this phenomenon as the
"happiness paradox"—people with more money tend to have greater
satisfaction with life, but increasing the income of all people does not
increase reported happiness.
The happiness paradox suggests that individuals have greater con-
cern with their relative places in the pecking order than with their ab-
solute income. A recent survey demonstrated this phenomenon by ask-
ing Harvard graduate students in which of two worlds they would
prefer to live." In the first world, they would earn $50,000 per year and
92 Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 409.
" Michael Argyle, Causes and Correlates of Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 25, at
353, 356-57 & figs, 18.1, 18.2.
"See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
95 These calculations were made by the author using data from Table 1. See supra note
84, Table 1, and accompanying text.
Be Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory, 111 ECON. J.
465, 472 (2001).
97 See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
" Sarni Solnick & David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A Survey on Positional Con-
cerns, 37 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 377 (1998).
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others would get half that income. In the second world, they would
earn $100,000 per year and others would get two and a half times that
income. Prices were the same in both worlds. Approximately half of the
students stated that they would prefer to live in the former world,
where they would be poorer, but enjoy a higher relative income.99
Individuals exhibited much less concern with their relative posi-
tions with respect to vacations. 109 Again, the survey asked students to
choose between two worlds. In the first world, they would get two
weeks holiday and others would get only one. In the second world,
they would get four weeks holiday, but others would get eight weeks.
Only one out of five students selected the first option, accepting a re-
duced absolute number of vacation days in order to have relatively
more days off than others.m In short, students displayed rivalry with
respect to income but not leisure.
Fredrik Carlsson, Olof johansson-Stenman, and Peter Martinsson
reached consistent results in a survey of Swedish citizens involving
more plausible alternative societies. 102
 They asked respondents to
choose the best society for a relative, living two generations in the fu-
ture. The survey defined "best" as the society in which the future rela-
tive would be most content.'"
In Society A, the relative earned 27,000 Swedish kroner (SEK)
per month (about $3500) in after-tax income, which is 10% less than
the average income of 30,000 SEK per month.'" The survey offered
three different versions of Society B. 195 In each version, the relative's
absolute income varied but always remained lower than in Society A.
In Society B, however, the relative earned 10% more than the average
income. The results are shown in Table 2. 106
99 Id. at 378. See generally Richard Layard, Towards a Happier Society, 2003 NEW S'IWVES-
MAN 26 (discussing the survey).
Solnick & Uemenway, supra note 98, at 379.
101 Id. at 378-79.
102
 EREDRIK CARLSSON ET AL., Do You ENJOY HAYING MORE rniAN OTHERS? SURVEY
EVIDENCE OF POSITIONAL Goons 11-12 (GOteborg Univ. Dept. of Econ., Working Papers in
Economics No. 100, 2003), available at http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/00002855/
01 /gunwpe0100.pdf.
103 Id. at 6.
l" Id. at 7, 21 tbl.l.
05 Id.
106 See id. Table 2 is based on data from Fredrik Carlsson, Olof johansson-Stenman,
and Peter Martinsson. See id. The income reduction column of Table 2, however, was calcu-
lated by the author.
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Table 2: Income for Your Future Relative
Relative's Income
or Consumption
Average Income
or Consumption
Income Reduc-
tion from Choos-
ing Society B
Share of Respon-
dents Choosing
Society B
Society A 27,000 30,000
Society B, version 1 25,250 22,950 6.5% 75%
Society B, version 2 22,000 20,000 18.5% 53%
Society B, version 3 14,800 13,450 45.2% 47%
Seventy-five percent of respondents chose a 6.5% reduction in
absolute income in exchange for a higher relative income. Fifty-three
percent were willing to accept an 18.5% reduction in absolute income
to maintain a higher relative position. Moreover, fully 47% of the re-
spondents chose to accept a greater than 45% reduction in absolute
income in order to maintain an above-average relative income. This
result is remarkable given the relatively small deviations of the prof-
fered income choices from the mean. Nearly half of the respondents
believed that their relative would be better off giving up almost half of
his or her real income in order to have an income 10% above the av-
erage rather than 10% below average.
Respondents showed substantially less competition regarding lei-
sure. Instead of focusing directly on leisure, the survey asked respon-
dents about working hours, presuming greater familiarity with that
concept. 107 In Society A, the relative worked forty hours per week,
about 10% more than the average of thirty-six working hours per
week." Again, the survey provided three different versions of Society
B. In each version, the relative worked longer hours than in Society A,
but labored three to four hours less than the average number of work-
ing hours in that society." Working hours varied as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Working Hours and Leisure for Your Future Relative
Relative's Work-
ing Hours per
Week
Average Working
Hours per Week
Work Increase
from Choosing
Society B
Share of Respon-
dents Choosing
Society B
Society A 40 36
Society B, version] 42.5 46 6.3% 40%
Society B, version 2 47 51 17.5% 19%
Society B, version 3 61 64 52.5% 10%
107 CARLSS014 ET AL, supra note 102, at 8. Note that if the number of leisure hours per
week in the absence of any work is eighty, then the percentage of leisure lost by choosing
Society B is equal to the percentage work increase from choosing Society B.
'°0 Id. at 9, 21 tbl.1.
'°9 Id. at 21 tbl.1.
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Forty percent of respondents thought their relative would prefer
to work an additional 2.5 hours per week in order to enjoy more lei-
sure than the average person. Less than one in five believed their rela-
tive would be better-off working an additional seven hours per week to
enjoy more leisure than others.
Surveys conducted regarding the value of the future relative's car
and the safety of the car obtained similar results. Respondents exhib-
ited greater rivalry with respect to the value of their relative's car then
with respect to the safety of that car.'"
Goods deriving much of their value from their role in improving
one's comparative status in society are labeled positional goods. By this
standard, income and the value of one's car might be characterized as
positional goods and leisure and car safety as nonpositional goods.
Worker surveys also suggest that job satisfaction correlates more
strongly with relative income than with absolute income." Strong
rivalry also has been found in laboratory experiments. In a recent
study, a majority of subjects were willing to "burn" some of the money
they would receive for participation in the experiment in order to re-
duce the cash earned by others.'"
C. Rivalry and Tax Policy
The evidence that a significant portion of the reported happiness
an individual receives from additiOnal income comes from improving
one's relative position on the income scale calls into question the tra-
ditional analysis that taxing the income from labor necessarily pro-
duces an efficiency or deadweight loss. As a positional good, the addi-
tional income earned by one individual reduces the relative position
and thus the welfare of others. This decline in the welfare of others is
a negative externality associated with earning additional income.
Thus, the argument that taxation produces inefficiency by reducing
work effort may be only half true. Taxation will reduce work effort,
but that reduction may not be inefficient.'" To illustrate, consider the
no Id. at 12, 21 tb1.1.
Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, Satisfaction and Comparison Income, 611 Pus.
ECON. 359, 360 (1996).
112 Daniel Zizzo & Andrew Oswald, Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others' Income?, 63-
64 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE Fr DE STATtsrriquE, July—Dec. 2001, at 12 & 39 fig. 2, available at
http://www.adres.prd.friannales/anciensnumeros/resumes/n6364/4.pdf.
us Layard, supra note 99, at 26; see FRANK, supra note 43, at 228. For an excellent analy-
sis of the implications for regulation of concern for relative position, see generally Robert
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kind of textbook example of the efficiency costs of taxation that stu-
dents might encounter in an introductory law school tax class.'"
Assume Alice currently earns an income of $100,000 per year and
works forty hours per week. She is debating whether to increase her
work week by four hours in order to earn an additional $10,000. Alice
would weigh the utility gain from the additional income against the
utility loss from the reduced leisure. Suppose Alice would gain ten
units of utility from the additional income (one unit of utility per
$1000 of extra income) and lose eight units of utility from her re-
duced leisure. In a no-tax world, Alice will work the additional hours
because she will receive a net gain of two units of utility.
Imagine, however, that Alice is subject to a 40% marginal tax rate
on that extra income so that, after taxes, she will receive only $6000
with a value of six units of utility. Now Alice will not work the extra
hours because her utility loss of eight units from reduced leisure out-
weighs her utility gain of six units. The tax-induced reduction in work
effort is inefficient—Alice loses the potential utility gain from work-
ing, and because she does not work, the government raises no tax
revenue." 5 This traditional example is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Work/Leisure Decision with No Rivalry—Alice
Additional After-
Tax Income from
Longer Work Week
Utility Gain from
Additional
Income
Utility Loss from
Reduced Leisure
Net Change in
Welfare from
Working
No Tax World
Mice $10,000 +10 –8 +2
40% Tax World
Mice $6000 +6 –8 –2
Now add to the picture Bob, who earns the same income and
works the same hours as Alice but does not have the opportunity to
earn additional money by working longer hours. Further, assume that
Alice and Bob are rivalrous with respect to each other's income, so
each gains or loses utility according to the amount their income is
higher or lower than the other. Specifically, each individual receives a
utility gain (loss) of one unit for each $2500 that the individual's in-
come is higher (lower) than that of the other.
H. Frank Be Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit  Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. Cut. L. REV.
323 (2001).
114
 See generally, e.g., JOSEPH BANRMAN, THOMAS GRIFFI111 & KATHERINE PRATT, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (3d ed. 2002).
115
 Any marginal tax rate above 20% will prevent Alice from working.
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Alice's ten unit gain from an additional $10,000 of income thus
can be divided into two components as follows: a positional gain of
four units from her relatively higher income than Bob and a nonposi-
tional gain of six units from the value of the extra income to her that
is unrelated to her relative position as compared to Bob.
Alice's additional income produces a positional utility loss for
Bob of four units—the same as the positional gain for Alice. Because
Alice does not bear this positional loss, it does not influence her deci-
sion to work. It does change, however, the efficiency of her decision to
work, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Work/Leisure Decision with Rivalry—Alice
Additional
Income front
Alice's Longer
Work Week
Positional
Utility Gain
(Loss)
Nonpositional
Utility Gain
Utility Loss
from
Reduced
Leisure
Net Change in
Welfare from
Alice's Longer
Work Week
No Tax World
Alice $10,000 +4 +6 –8 +2
Bob 0 –4 0 0 -4
Total $10,000 0 +6 –8 –2
Alice's decision to work produces a net utility loss of two units
because Bob's loss of four units of utility must be subtracted from Al-
ice's net gain of two units. The implementation of a 40% marginal
income tax can prevent this inefficiency by discouraging Alice from
working. In fact, a 40% tax rate on Alice's additional income reaches
the optimal result in this example because it matches the negative ex-
ternality produced by the earning of that additional income.
The potential cost of rivalrous behavior in a no-tax world be-
comes even larger if both Bob and Alice can vary their working hours.
If Bob's preferences and opportunities equal those of Alice, he too
will choose to work the longer work week because doing so will lead to
a net utility gain of two units. This outcome is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Work/Leisure Decision with Riva ry—Alice and Bob
Additional
Income from
Longer Work
Week
Positional
Utility Gain
(Loss)
Nonpositional
Utility Gain
Utility Loss
from
Reduced
Leisure
Net Change in
Welfare from
Longer Work
Week
No Tax World
Alice $10,000 0 +6 –8 –2
Bob $10,000 0 +6
–8 –2
Total $20,000 0 +12 –16 –4
Figure 7
Bob's Utility
Work Don't Work
Alice's Utility	 Work
Don't Work
-2, -2 +2, - 4
-4, +2 0, 0
2004]	 Progressive Taxation and Happiness 	 1387
The utility changes shown in Table 6 take the form of a classic
prisoner's dilemma, as shown in Figure 7.
In the no-tax world, Alice and Bob each are always better off
working, regardless of the other's choice. If, however, both individuals
work, each will be worse off than if neither worked. We may avoid the
adverse results of this "worker's dilemma" by instituting a tax on addi-
tional earnings equal to the negative externality produced by those
earnings. Such a tax makes both Alice and Bob better off.
Great uncertainty surrounds the precise portion of the gains
from a higher income that are positional, but studies indicate the por-
tion is not trivial. The survey of Sivedish citizens discussed in Part III.B
suggests that approximately half of the utility received from additional
income comes from relative concerns. 11° A survey of students at the
University of Costa Rica reached similar results."? Surveying the lit-
erature in 2001, Robert Frank and Cass Sunstein stated that, under
the most conservative estimates, a family requires an income increase
of about 3.3% to balance a 10% increase in the incomes of everyone
else in the community. 118
116 See CARLSSON ET AL., supra note 102, at 15.
" 7 Ste generally FRANCISCO ALPIZAR ET AL., How Mum Do WE CARE ABOUT ABSOLUTE
VERSUS RELATIVE INCOME AND CONSUMPTION? (GOtebmg Unit Dept. of Econ., Working
Papers in Economics No. 63, 2001) (forthcoming publication in J. ECON, BEHAV. & ORG.
(20041), available at http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/clata/html/html/PDF/gunwpe0063.1x1f.
"8 Frank & Sunstein, supm note 113, at 353.
1388	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:1363
In sum, if the additional consumption of goods by an individual
produces a greater negative externality than the additional consump-
tion of leisure, it is efficient to place a tax on such consumption equal
to that additional externality. The optimal size of the efficient tax is
unclear, but it is likely to be significant.
IV. BEYOND RIVALRY—ADAPTATION, ASPIRATION, AND
THE HEDONIC TREADMILL
A. Misjudging the Value of Money
Part III discussed the harm that individuals impose on others by
increasing their consumption of positional goods." 9 This Part looks at
the harm individuals inflict upon themselves by overestimating the
additional happiness that additional consumption will produce.'"
People value money highly. When asked what change would most
improve the quality of their lives, individuals most frequently respond
with the answer "more money." 121 The actual increase in reported hap-
piness from additional income, however, appears to be quite modest. A
study of Illinois lottery winners, for example, found that their happi-
ness did not differ significantly from controls.' 22 Moreover, lottery win-
ners report significantly less pleasure than non-lottery controls from
ordinary experiences such as talking to a friend, eating breakfast, and
even from hearing a funny joke.'" Similarly, most people think that a
25% increase in their pay will increase greatly their satisfaction with
their lives, but individuals whose incomes are currently at that level do
not report significantly greater life satisfaction.t 24
113 See supra notes 83-118 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 121-151 and accompanying text.
121 FRANK, supra note 43, at 111 (citing ANGUS CAMPBELL, THE SENSE OF WELL-BEING
IN AMERICA (1981)); see ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, INCOME AND WELL-BEING: AN EMPIRI-
CAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMPARISON INCOME EFFECT 3 (Tinbergen Inst., Disc. Paper No. TI
2002-019/3, 2002) (forthcoming publication in J. PUB. EcoN. (2004)), available at http://
www.tinhergen.nl/discussionpapers/02019.pdf.
' 22 Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 920 (1978).
123 Id. at 921. Lottery winners and controls were asked to rate on a scale from zero to
five how pleasant they found each of seven activities or events. In addition to the events
listed in the above text, other events included watching television, getting a compliment,
reading a magazine, and buying clothes. The mean score for lottery winners was 3.33. The
mean score for non winners was 3.82. Id. at 919-21.
124 ROBERT E. LANE, THE Loss OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 71 (2000).
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13. Adaptation and Aspiration Theory
I now turn to two related explanations for the limited impact addi-
tional income has on the well-being of an individual, even when the
income of others is held constant—adaptation theory and aspiration the-
my. Adaptation theory posits that more material goods provide addi-
tional pleasure at first, but that the impact is largely temporary. 125 Lot-
tery winners, for example, view winning the prize as a very happy event.
When surveyed one to eighteen months later, however, their happiness
levels do not differ significantly from non-winning controls.'" More-
over, as noted above, lottery whiners report less pleasure from mun-
dane life events such as watching television or hearing a funny joke.'"
Aspiration theory holds that an individual's aspiration level rises
as income rises. In general, an individual's aspiration level for income
is somewhat higher than the individual's current income. 128 As one
earns more money, the amount of income considered satisfactory in-
creases. The ex ante increase in welfare that individuals expect from a
rise in income is greater than the ex post increase in welfare that actu-
ally occurs. 129 In retrospect, then, the rise in income is a disappoint-
ment. 1 " One study found that this preference shift destroys anoroxi-
mately two-thirds of the welfare effect of an increase in income. 131
C. Nonmonetary Correlates of Happiness and Another Look
at Economic Growth
Recent research sheds light an a number of nonmonetary corre-
lates of happiness. Some of the most important factors in happiness
likely cannot be improved by government policy. In this vein, genetic
endowment clearly plays a very important role." 2 Identical twins sepa-
125 Alois Stutzer, The Rote of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness, 54 j. EcoN. BE-
HAV. & ORG. 89,90 (2004); see also BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS &ELMER, HAPPINESS AND Eco-
NOMICS 12 (2002).
126
 Brickman et al., supra note 122, at 920-21 tb1.1.
127 Id. at 919-21 tbl.1.
120
 Kahneman, .supra note 26, at 14; seevan Praag & Frijters, supra note 44, at 421.
129 VtIn Praag & Frijters, supra note 44, at 422.
150 Id.
151 FREY & S.rt•rzEtt, supra note 125, at 86. Individuals also make poor predictions of
their behavior in other contexts, such as ;
 the ability to resist temptation. Visitors to Las
Vegas, for example, tend to overestimate their capacities to resist excessive gambling, and
credit card users tend to overrate their abilities to maintain a zero balance. George Lowen-
stein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nicer Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING, supra
note 25, at 85,92-94.
152 Diener & Lucas, supra note 39, at 216-17.
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rated at birth, for example, tend to have similar levels of happiness.'"
Individuals generally maintain relatively constant levels of subjective
well-being throughout their lives despite changing circumstances.'"
Love relationships significantly impact life satisfaction. Marriage is
one of the strongest correlates of happiness for both men and
women."5 Living with a partner achieves the same impact on happiness
as an 81% increase in income.'" In monetary terms, marriage is worth
an additional $100,000 per year when compared to being widowed or
separated."7
 More frequent sexual activity also increases happiness. A
recent study estimated that increasing intercourse from once a month
to once a week equals the amount of happiness generated by getting an
additional $50,000 in income for the average American.'"
It is unlikely that government policy can have a significant impact
on the number of successful marriages or the frequency of spousal sex-
ual intimacy. 159
 Other factors conducive to happiness, however, may
show more susceptibility to government intervention through the tax
system or direct spending programs. Perhaps the reason economic
growth has produced scant improvement in happiness in the United
States during the past several decades comes from the fact that the ad-
ditional resources from that growth have been misspent. Americans
have used economic growth to purchase additional consumption rather
iss Id. at 216.
"4 Id. at 214-15.
1" Argyle, supra note 93, at 359. The positive impact of marriage on happiness is still
found after controlling for factors such as age, gender, and income. Id. at 360. Marriage is also
strongly correlated with improved mental health, reduced drug use, and better physical
health. For a recent review of the literature, see Chris M. Wilson & Andrew J. Oswald, How Does
Marriage Affect Physical and Psychological Health! A Survey of the Longitudinal Evidence (2002), at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/oswald/wilsonos-waldmarriage
jan2002.pdf.
"8 FERRER-I-CARBONELL, supra note 121, at 18.
137 Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 70, at 1373 (reporting the necessary "compen-
sation" in 1990 U.S. dollars).
135 DAvin C. BLANCIIFLOWER & ANDREW J. OSWALD, MONEY, SEX AND HAPPINESS: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W10499, 2004),
available at h up:// papers.n bersorg/ papers/w10499.pdf.
I" Legalizing gay marriage, however, might have a significant positive impact on the
well-being of same-sex couples. See MARK STRASSER, ON SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UN-
IONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 23-26,101-10 (2002) (discussing the importance and benefits
of marriage over civil unions for gays and lesbians). See generally David B. Cruz, Just Don't
Call It Marriage: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 926 (2001) (discussing the importance and emotional significance of marriage to gay
couples).
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than additional leisure. They spend more hours at work now than they
did a half century ago. 140
As discussed earlier, the utility of additional goods is likely to be
reduced by rivalry to a greater extent than additional consumption of
leisure. Moreover, evidence suggests that leisure activities, if chosen
wisely, can produce a significant improvement in well-being.
Social interaction can improve happiness. Participating in regular
social activities, including entertaining friends and attending cultural
and social events, appears to be conducive to happiness, particularly
among retirees who are less able to gain satisfaction front work-related
activities. 141 Volunteer work likely has a positive effect on the volun-
teer's well-being."2 Leisure time spent exercising also correlates with
subjective well-being. 143 Leisure activities that occur in groups such as
teams and social clubs exhibit a particular likelihood of increasing
happiness by providing social support and integration.'" Alterna-
tively, individuals who spend large amounts of leisure titne watching
television tend to be less happy titan those who engage in more inter-
active social activities."3
Although the manner in which any individual spends leisure time
is a matter of private choice, wise social programs can make it easier
for individuals to make more productive use of their time off. For ex-
ample, expanded community centers (combined with public trans-
portation to get there) can encourage leisure activities involving social
interaction. Publicly-funded recreational facilities can promote both
healthful exercise and increased social interaction at the same time.
Because good health strongly correlates with happiness, social policies
to ensure adequate healthcare also demonstrate a likelihood of in-
creasing social welfare.
Inflation and unemployment reduce happiness, even after taking
into account the effect on income. The well-known "misery index"
adds together the inflation rate and the unemployment rate as a
measure of the distress caused by current economic conditions. Re-
cent research, however, suggests that an additional percentage point
140 FRANK, supra note 43, at 49; JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN 29 {1991).
141 Nancy Cantor & Catherine A. Sanderson, Life Task Participation and Well-Being: The
Importance of Taking Part in Deity Life, in WELL-BEING, supra note 25, at. 230,231.
142 See id. at 231-32.
143 Argyle, supra note 93, at 364.
144 Id.
145 M. Television, however, does have a positive relaxing effect as well. On balance,
moderate amounts of television probably improve well-being, but large amounts have a
negative impact, especially if television viewing replaces social interaction. See id.
• t
f it s
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of unemployment reduces welfare substantially more than an extra
percentage point of infiation." 6 Unemployed workers suffer reduced
self-esteem, increased boredom, and less structure in their lives, in
addition to lower income. 147
 Perhaps two-thirds of the decline in wel-
fare from unemployment derives from nonpecuniary loss. 148
High unemployment also reduces the welfare of those who are
employed, perhaps by increasing their fear of becoming jobless)"
The social costs of these indirect fears can be larger in the aggregate
than the direct costs to the unemployed because they affect a much
greater number of people)" Government programs to reduce unem-
ployment or to provide support for unemployed workers thus may
increase social welfare)" More generally, if much of private spending
is wasteful because it is motivated largely by positional concerns, then
increased spending (funded by higher taxes) on nonrivalrous social
programs, such as environmental clean-up and better police and fire
services, may be optimal.
V. HAPPINESS AND INEQUALITY.
In this Part, I discuss whether inequality negatively affects individ-
ual utility even after controlling for individual income. 152
 Put differ-
endy, do people, regardless of their own income, dislike living in an
unequal society?
Studies on this question show mixed results. Some researchers
have found a strong correlation between income equality and well-
being after controlling for economic prosperity, while others have
found little connection)" Moreover, recent research suggests that the
answer is very different for Europeans and Americans. Inequality op-
116 FREY & STUTZER, supra note 125, at 114-15. One additional percentage point of
unemployment appears to reduce welfare by about as much as L7 additional percentage
points of inflation. See Rafael Di Tella et al., Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evi-
dence from Surveys of Happiness, 91 Am. ECON. REV. 335,339 (2001).
147 FREY & STurzER, supra note 125, at 99-100; Argyle, supra note 93, at 363-64.
146 FREY & STUTEER, supra note 125, at 99.
149 Di Tella et ai., supra note 65, at 819.
150 Id.
151 See id. at 821 (finding that increased unemployment benefits improved societal well-
being). Rafael Di Tella, Robert J. MacCulloch, and Andrew J. Oswald found no evidence
that generous welfare benefits were responsible for high unemployment rates in Europe.
Id. at 822.
152 See infra notes 153-176 and accompanying text.
.153
 Diener & Oishi, supra note 46, at 205-07.
20041	 Progressive Taxation and Happiness	 1393
pears to have a significant impact on happiness in Europe, but little
impact in the United States. 154
For Europeans, the distaste for inequality varies according to
their political beliefs and social class. Inequality has a significant nega-
tive impact on Europeans who define themselves as leftists, but has no
impact on those who define themselves as rightists. 155 Inequality seem-
ingly affects the happiness of poor Europeans, but it does not affect
the happiness of rich Europeans. 156 Similarly, Europeans who view
themselves as leftists exhibit a greater likelihood than rightists of view-
ing unemployment as a relatively larger problem than inflation.' 57 In
the United States, conversely, only rich leftists demonstrate a distaste
for inequality. 155
Europeans and Americans differ sharply in their views of the ori-
gins of poverty. In the United States, 60% of respondents believe that
the poor are lazy, as compared to only 26% of Europeans. 159 Sixty per-
cent of Europeans, but only 29% of Americans, agree that "the poor
are trapped in poverty." 160 Fifty-four percent of Europeans, but only
30% of Americans, believe that "luck determines income." 16 '
Not surprisingly, government policies reflect these differences in
attitudes. Government transfers to households, including social secu-
rity, amount to 17.6% of GDP in Europe but only 10,6% of GDP in the
United States. 162 European nations also provide larger family benefits,
public healthcare systems, disability benefits, and poverty relief. 155
164 Alberto Alesina et al., Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?
88J. Pun. EGON, 2009, 2034 (2004).
155 Id. at 2033-34. The definitions used are broad. Rich and poor are defined as the
top and bottom halves of the income distribution. Leftist and rightist include those slightly
to the left and right of the political center. For example, in the United States, leftist in-
cludes all Democrats and Independents leaning towards the Democrats. See id. at 203041.
166 Id. at 2033-34.
162 Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Partisan Social Happiness, REV. ECON. Stun.
22 (manuscript forthcoming n.d.), available at http://www.restud.org.uk/PDF/03_2004/
Di Tella_%20Macculloch.pdf (date posted Mar. 2004).
158 Alesina et al., supra note 154, at 2033-34.
159 See Alberto Alesina et al., Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare
State?. 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187, 243 tb1.13. (2001).
1 eo Id.
561 Id.
162 ALBERT ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, F/GIITING POVERTY IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE
17 th1.2.1 (2004). The European number is the simple average of data from the following
thirteen nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Neth-
erlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Id. at 17 th1.2.1.
163 Id. at 19 tb1.2.2.
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Economic explanations for the intercontinental differences in
views on redistribution and poverty are not persuasive. The stronger
European preference for government redistribution cannot be ex-
plained by greater pre-tax inequality of income because the United
States exhibits greater pre-tax inequality. 1" Further, despite a wide-
spread belief among Americans that they enjoy greater social mobility
than Europeans—that the poor of today may be the rich of tomor-
row—data ,suggest that social mobility is fairly similar in the United
States and Europe. 165
Stronger evidence exists, however, to support the idea that race
plays an important role in shaping attitudes toward the poor. Racial
divisions may reduce support for redistribution when minority groups
are disproportionately poor. 166
 In the United States, non-Hispanic
Whites comprise 70.7% of the population, but only 46.1% of people
in poverty. 167
 The Black poverty rate of 23.6% is approximately three
times higher than the non-Hispanic White poverty rate of 7.7%. 1"
This, combined with geographic isolation, may make it easier to view
the poor as the "other." Politicians who oppose redistribution often
use racial animus to persuade even relatively poor Whites to oppose
redistributive policies. 170
According to surveys conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
a majority of Whites in the United States believe that Blacks would be
as wealthy as Whites if they tried hard enough. 171 Support for welfare
in the United States is higher among people who live near welfare re-
cipients of the same race, but lower among people who live near wel-
fare recipients of a different race.'" States that are more ethnically
fragmented spend a smaller portion of their budgets on social ser-
vices.'" States with larger Black populations historically have had less
164 Id. at 3, 57-60.
166 Id. at 3-4, 60-68.
166 Sec id. at 10, 134,
167 Alesina et al., supra note 159, at 230.
' 68 Id.
169
 Id. at 229.
170
 ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 162, at 10.
171
 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPsE-r, AMERICAN EXGEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 133
(19961; Alesina et al., supra note 159, at 229.
172 Alesina et al., supra note 159, at 229; Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Group Loyally and the Taste for
Redistribution, 109J. Pot,. ECON. 500, 508-11 (2001).
' 75
 ALBERTO ALESINA ET AL., POLITICAL JURISDICTIONS IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNI-
TIES (Harv. Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1949, 2002) available at http://
post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2002papers/HIER1949.pdf.
2004]	 Progressive Taxation and Happiness	 1395
generous welfare programs. 174 International comparisons produce
similar results—racially fractionalized countries tend to spend less on
social services than racially homogenous nations. 175
Policies based on racial bias not only are unfair to the disfavored
Black and Latino minorities, but directly harm all poor citizens. Poli-
cies based on racial stereotypes also may not be in the long-run self-
interest even of Whites who are not poor. Poverty produces spillover
effects such as higher crime rates. Moreover, all citizens are likely to
be happier in a more integrated, less racially divided world. For ex-
ample, prior to the civil rights movement in the 1960s, there was
strong opposition to any racial mixing among most Southern Whites
(and among many Northern Whites). Interviews with those same in-
dividuals today indicate that many regret their former attitudes and
are happier with the current racial climate. They now realize that
their former racist preferences not only had a devastating impact on
Blacks, but also reduced their own well-being.'"
VI. TAX POLICY AND HAPPINESS
A. Positional Goods and the Luxury Tax
I argued earlier that consumption of goods generally is more ri-
valrous or positional than the consumption of leisure and that this
difference justified a higher tax rate on consumption.'" Some goods,
however, are substantially more positional than others. Very expensive
watches and exotic sports cars, for example, are likely to receive much
of their value from their high cost. In some cases, such as rare stamps
and collectibles, their only value may lie in their scarcity.
One could make the case, then, that it would be optimal to iden-
tify those goods that are consumed primarily to display the owner's
wealth and subject those goods to a high luxury tax, 178 Well over a
174 Alesina et al., supra note 159, at 235-36 (relying on data from 1990).
175 Irk at 229-32.
176 See generally LITTLE ROCK CENTRAL HIGH 40TH ANNIVERSARY COMM'N, SEPTEMBER,
1997—THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF ONE OF AMERICA'S MOST IMPORTANT CIVIL RIGHTS
Evorrs (2000), at http://www.centralhigh57.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) (celebrating,
through multimedia website, heroism of black students who desegregated the high school
in 1957); BILL MOVERS, A WALK THROUGH THE 20711 CENTURY WITH BILL MOVERS, EPI-
SODE 1: MARSHALL, TEXAS (Corp. for Emmet & Learning 1984) (illustrating, through
documentary film, changed racial relations in town of Marshall, Texas).
177
	 supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
178
 The classic analysis of goods purchased for the purpose of demonstrating the
owner's wealth or social status was made by Thorstein Veblen, who coined the phrase "con-
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century ago, John Stuart Mill argued that while commodity taxes of-
ten are not optimal, taxing certain luxury goods may be an exception:
I disclaim all asceticism, and by no means wish to see dis-
couraged, either by law or opinion, any indulgence ...
which is sought from a genuine inclination for, any enjoy-
ment of, the thing itself; but a great portion of the expenses
of the higher and middle classes in most countries ... is not
incurred for the sake of the pleasure afforded by the things
on which the money is spent, but from regard to opinion,
and an idea that certain expenses are expected from them,
as an appendage of station; and I cannot but think that ex-
penditure of this sort is a most desirable subject of taxation.
If taxation discourages it, some good is done, and if not, no
harm; for in so far as taxes are levied on things which are de-
sired and possessed from motives of this description, nobody
is the worse for them. When a thing is bought not for its use
but for its costliness, cheapness is no recommendation. 179
When a largely positional good can be easily identified, Mill may
be correct that a luxury tax is appropriate. Finding the right good to
tax, however, involves great complexity. Consider, for example, the tax
on luxury automobiles enacted during the William J. Clinton admini-
stration. 184 Few doubt that part of the value of owning a luxury auto-
mobile for many individuals may be found in the prestige associated
with its purchase. Similarly, the purchase of an expensive car by one
individual can reduce the welfare of others. Smith's recently purchased
Mazda Miata sports car is less impressive when his neighbor Jones
drives home in a new Porsche 911 Carrera. Nonetheless, it is unclear
whether the luxury car tax led to the purchase of appreciably fewer po-
sitional goods. Instead, consumers may have switched to other posi-
spicuous consumption." THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF '111E LEISURE CLASS 68-101
(Viking Press 1965) (1899). For a recent article advocating policy interventions to reduce
the overconsumption of positional goods, see CARLSSON ET AL., supra note 102, at 2-3.
179 JOAN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WI'T'H SOME OF THEIR AP-
PLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, bk. 5, ch. 6, pt. 7 (Wj. Ashley, ed., Longmans, Green
& Co. 1909) (1848) (basing edition on seventh edition prepared by John Stuart Mill),
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mIPContents.html  (last visited Oct. 15,
20041.
la° See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388-439 (repealed 2002). The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 placed a 10% tax on
the excess of any money spent above the threshold price of $30,000 on automobiles. In
1998, the tax was reduced to 8% of any amount in excess of $36,000. The tax was then
phased down yearly until December 31, 2002, when it was repealed. See id.
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tional goods which were not subject to the luxury tax. Expensive SUV's,
for example, which were classified as trucks and thus were exempt from
the luxury tax on cars, saw a dramatic increase in sales during the Clin-
ton years. 181
More to the point, many goods have a substantial positional
value. Suppose, for example, instead of purchasing a Porsche 911
sports car, Jones purchases a less expensive automobile and uses the
money saved to purchase a Viking range, a Subzero refrigerator, a
high-definition plasma television, several Armani suits, and a week-
long vacation in the Bahamas. 182 Or instead Jones might use the sav-
ings to add an extra bedroom to his home. These alternative expendi-
tures might engender greater jealousy from Jones's neighbors than
the purchase of an expensive sports car. Perhaps Jones's neighbor is
an environmentalist who has just purchased a gas-electric hybrid Toy-
ota Prins and who feels only contempt for anyone buying an expen-
sive gas-guzzling sports car. 188 In light of the large number of con-
sumption items that have a significant positional component, it makes
sense to adopt a general progressive income (or consumption) tax
rather than a series of taxes on luxury items.
B. The Structure of Redistribution
The classic notion of declining marginal utility throughout the
income distribution remains sound. Nevertheless, the traditional
shape of the marginal utility curve where utility from income varies
with the logarithm of income may need some adjustment. The impact
of additional income on different groups may be a difference in kind
rather than simply one of degree. For poor individuals, whose in-
comes purchase goods that satisfy basic needs, most of the goods pur-
chased will be nonpositional. These goods are likely to have a rela-
tively low negative externality from rivalry and may actually have a
positive externality to the extent that individuals (for example, rich
181 See also FRANK, supra note 43, at 205 (noting that the explosive sales of SUVs coin-
cided with the imposition of the tax on luxury automobiles).
182 A Porsche 911 Carrera is likely to cost at least $80,000 and may cost more than
double that amount, depending on the model and options. A well-equipped Mazda Miata
costs less than $30,000.
10 Such neighbors might include celebrity Prius owners Bill Maher, Larry David, and
Arianna HtangtOn. See Larry Armstrong, Thyota's New Prins: The Hottest Hybrid, BUS, WK.
ONLINE (Sept. 4, 2003), at http://wwwbusinessweek.com/technolog-y/content/sep2003/
tc2003094_0298_tc127.htm (noting that "what this car says about the owner is undoubt-
edly the reason it has a celebrity following").
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leftists) have a distaste for inequality.' 84
 Income satisfying basic needs
also is likely to show little decline in value from adaptation.' Thus,
while politicians champion "middle-class tax cuts," such cuts are likely
to produce a far smaller improvement in well-being than would be
achieved by using that same revenue to provide basic services for the
poor or to fund nonrivalrotts public services.
CONCLUSION
The strongest traditional justification for progressive taxation is
that income has declining marginal utility, and therefore, redistribu-
tion from the rich to the poor can increase total welfare in a society.
Happiness research is consistent with this justification and provides
important additional insights about the reasons money declines in
value. Moreover, happiness research suggests that additional income
spent on positional goods may have little impact on overall welfare in
a society because the positional gains by one individual will be offset
by the positional losses of another. In addition, adaptation and
changes in aspiration levels may diminish the gains from additional
consumption. The challenge for policymakers lies in the design of tax
and spending policies which provide lasting improvements in the
overall happiness of society.
154 See Alesina et al., supra note 159, at 2033-34.
1 as See Diener & Suh, supra note 25, at 945-46.
